It is night on the Kharkiv front, in the third year of the war between Ukraine and Russia. A Ukrainian soldier leaves his hideout in the darkness and heads towards a recently arrived vehicle. He quickly removes essential supplies that will allow his unit to hold its position over the coming days. The following night, in a nearby location, two Ukrainian soldiers wounded in combat are evacuated in another vehicle after waiting several days. It is a high-risk rescue mission, as the soldiers were injured deep within the contact zone between the opposing forces[1]. Both episodes could be seen as “ordinary” in the context of an armed conflict, were it not for the fact that, in both cases, the vehicle carrying out the mission was a remotely operated Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV).
The robotisation of war
The intensive use of unmanned vehicles has marked the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict — initially in the air (commonly known as drones) and at sea — and, more recently, on land. This resulted not so much from a clear initial strategy on the part of the belligerents, but from the needs imposed by the conflict. From the outset, the Ukrainian armed forces had far fewer resources than their Russian counterparts. Additionally, limited production capacity and concerns about escalation led their allies, from the beginning, to restrict access to their most sophisticated and powerful weaponry.
The Ukrainians saw drones as a way to counter these disadvantages. They began using them mainly for surveillance and to support artillery and land forces. They quickly realised their offensive potential as a relatively “cheap” way to destroy far more expensive ground units. Ukrainian drones may cost only a few thousand euros. Yet, they have proved highly effective in destroying equipment such as Russian tanks and artillery systems, whose estimated cost is in the millions.
In the maritime domain too, unmanned boats have enabled Ukraine — with virtually no manned surface vessels — to destroy several major Russian navy ships, contributing to disabling the Black Sea fleet[2]. More recently, as illustrated by the two episodes described above, the use of ground robots has also increased, both for support and combat missions.
The increasingly frequent use of drones by the Ukrainian military led the Russians, in turn, to deploy their own to counter Ukraine’s initial advantage in this field. This resulted in an escalation on both sides in the number and sophistication of drones used, as well as in their incorporation into operational doctrine. Ukraine now has a separate branch of its armed forces dedicated to unmanned systems. In June this year, the Ukrainian Defence Minister stated that the country is capable of producing 10 million drones annually[3]. Russia is believed to have similar or greater capabilities, particularly in producing long-range loitering munitions for aerial attacks.
The conflict is also characterised by an intense technological race, marked by the continuous introduction of new technologies on the battlefield and by development and deployment cycles measured in just a few weeks. Progress is being made in several areas, including communications, autonomy, and integrated command platforms that strengthen coordination between reconnaissance systems and offensive capabilities.
The use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems is likewise increasingly common. Some Ukrainian attack drones already rely on AI to autonomously carry out the final few hundred metres of flight towards their targets, allowing them to avoid electronic warfare countermeasures[1]. In a recent high-profile incident, the combination of AI systems and human control also enabled Ukrainian drones to conduct a special operation deep inside Russian territory, destroying multiple bomber aircraft[2].
Lessons from the battlefield
From a military standpoint, the war between Ukraine and Russia has offered significant lessons and raised critical strategic questions.
Firstly, the conflict raises doubts about the wisdom of significant investments in expensive, difficult-to-replace equipment. It has become evident that mobility and stealth provide better guarantees of survivability than any armour. Large and heavy platforms — whether tanks, aircraft, or ships — have often been relegated to secondary roles due to their high cost, which starkly contrasts with the somewhat disconcerting ease with which they are destroyed, often by substantially cheaper means.
Secondly, future conflicts are expected to be increasingly “robotised”, involving unmanned systems for both combat and logistical operations. While these are generally still remotely operated, the urgency of achieving a technological edge suggests a growing trend towards autonomous systems[3]. This raises significant ethical questions regarding responsibility for decisions. It also presents unresolved technological challenges concerning how to maintain meaningful human control in complex scenarios where multiple AI systems make critical decisions within very short timeframes.
Thirdly, one of the most significant difficulties Ukraine has faced since the beginning of the conflict is its heavy reliance on external support. On the one hand, European and American production — Ukraine’s main allies — has been insufficient and unable to scale up rapidly to support Ukraine without compromising their own defence needs. On the other hand, due to political and strategic considerations, Ukrainian forces have been restricted in their access to the most powerful and sophisticated equipment of their allies. And even when they gain access, the way they may use such systems is often limited.
Finally, the adage that wars are won and lost through logistics remains as accurate today as ever. Faced with the limitations of external supply, Ukraine has very rapidly developed a substantial domestic manufacturing capacity, particularly in drone production. It is now at the forefront of technological development for these devices. Russia, for its part, has also significantly reinforced its logistics chain to enable mass production of drones and other armaments. Both sides are incorporating new technological advances in rapid development cycles measured not in years or months, but in weeks.
The urgency of innovation and sovereignty
European armed forces, including Portugal’s, are now tasked with rebuilding operational capabilities that have been neglected for many years. To do so, they must anticipate how conflict scenarios will evolve — and in this respect, the war in Ukraine offers essential lessons. One of the most significant is that robotic systems and artificial intelligence will increasingly play a central role on the battlefield. They are less expensive platforms and therefore easier to produce in large quantities and more expendable compared with aircraft, ships, or battle tanks. Yet they can have a substantial strategic impact, particularly when integrated effectively with more conventional systems. Armed forces must prepare for this future with urgency, investing in both technical and human resources and developing strategies to harness this new operational paradigm fully.
In high-intensity conflict scenarios, ensuring resource availability while avoiding strategic dependencies and production bottlenecks becomes crucial. This means that the selection and development processes for robotic platforms must consider the complexity, resilience, and scalability of the logistics chain — that is, the capacity to withstand disruptions and respond quickly to increased needs. This will require investment in near-shore production, enabling countries to build and maintain a logistical base and critical knowledge, ensuring independence and resilience wherever possible. It will also be essential to establish effective communication channels between the armed forces and the industrial sector, ensuring that operational needs are swiftly conveyed to those developing the systems, thereby accelerating innovation cycles and deployments with strategic impact.
The world appears to be returning to an era we believed to be behind us: a period of rivalry and fragmentation, where force is used as a means rather than a last resort. For countries like Portugal and Europe as a whole, this scenario is worrying. But the war in Ukraine demonstrates that superiority does not depend solely on the volume of resources, but on the ability to innovate and adapt. Robotic systems are redefining the rules of combat, presenting not only technological challenges but also organisational and strategic ones. It is imperative to anticipate, adapt, and innovate before the next conflict renders current doctrines obsolete. Peace — or at least the absence of conflict — may depend on it.
